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Introduction. In static one-shot games, Nash equilibria are frequently not Pareto optimal. Thus, not seldom cooperation can improve payo¤s to all players. In particular, in two person games, if a Nash equilibrium consist of strategies in the interior of the strategy sets, Pareto improvements are usually possible. Similar results hold for dynamic games where either open loop or closed loop controls are allowed. Su¢ cient conditions for Pareto improvements to be possible are stated and proved below. In Appendix a result on existence of open loop Nash equilibria is added, useful for an example on Pareto inoptimality presented below. (The assumptions di¤er from those appearing in existence results found in the references.)
Let us …rst consider the simple case of a static one shot game with m players. Let r i be the strategy of player i, R i his strategy set (a given interval), F i (r 1 ; :::; r m ) the payo¤ to player i:
Let …rst m = 2 and let (r 1 ; r 2 ) be a Nash equilibrium.
Assume that (i) r i are interior points in R i and that the following condition on partial derivatives holds:
(ii) @F 1 (r 1 ; r 2 )=@r 2 6 = 0; @F 2 (r 1 ; r 2 )=r 1 6 = 0:
Then (r 1 ; r 2 ) is not Pareto optimal.
To see this, note that by moving the strategy slightly each player can increase the payo¤ of the opponent in the …rst order, with only a second order e¤ect on one's own payo¤. (The condition (ii) can most often be expected to hold:
1 Adress; Department of economics, Box 1095 Blindern, 0317 Oslo. e-mail:atle.seierstad@econ.uio.no 2 Comments from K.Sydsaeter have been very useful in order to improve the exposition.
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For example, F 1 is not optimized with respect to r 2 ; so chances are high that F 1 2 6 = 0:) For more than two players, su¢ cient conditions for Pareto inoptimality are more demanding: If (i) holds, and, for all i; all F j ri (r 1 ; :::; r m ); j 6 = i; di¤er from zero and have the same sign for all j, then a strict Pareto improvement is possible (all players strictly better o¤).
I. The dynamic game
Let x (i) 2 R ni be the state of player i; u (i) 2 R ki be the control of player i; taking values in a given set U i ; x = (x (1) ; :::; x (m) ); u = (u (1) ; :::; u (m) ); f (i) (t; x; u) be the instantaneous reward to player i; _ x = g (i) (t; x; u) be the state equation of player i:
We assume that f (i) and g (i) are C 1 (they take values in R and R ni ; respectively). There are given natural numbers k i and k i ; k i k i and real numbers x seeks a control u (i) (:) 2 U i such that, given u (j) (:); j 6 = i; the criterion in (1) is maximized, subject to the condition x (i) (T ) 2 A i : He/she is forced to have x (i) (T ) 2 A i satis…ed, but he/she disregard all conditions x (j) (T ) 2 A j ; j 6 = i; (to have the latter conditions satis…ed is not his/her problem but the problem of the other players!) Player i takes into consideration the in ‡uence of u (i) on all x (j) : We shall also consider problems where there are no end conditions, (all A i are replaced by R ni ):
In a special case considered below, (C), f (i) and g (i) will not depend on u (j) ; j 6 = i: Still player i takes into account the in ‡uence of u (i) on all x (j) ; j 6 = i; via the in ‡uence of x (i) on these entities, (or more precisely, he takes into consideration the interplay between all the x (j) 's when choosing u (i) ):
To condition (4), there corresponds a transversality condition (explained in more detail below): 
and de…ne
(1) (t); ::; p
; where the vector function p
and where p
Now, by the maximum principle, there exist a p (i) 0 2 f0; 1g and a function p (i) (:) with the above properties such thatû (i) (t) maximizes
In what follows, some di¤erent cases are discussed.
A In the present case, all A i = R n ; so there are no end constraints and p
(j) (T ) = 0 for all i and j:
Consider …rst the subcase
Let us write down the adjoint equations in this case. For i = 1 (player 1), dp
For i = 2 (player 2); dp
(1) g
(1)
All derivatives on the right hand sides are evaluated at (t;x (1) ;x (2) ;û (1) ;û (2) ).
Assume allû
For j 6 = i;û (j) (t) does not usually maximize
and, in fact, chances are high that
A su¢ cient condition for Pareto inoptimality is as follows.
Theorem 1. Assume m = 2, (9) and no end conditions. If for i = 1; 2, the derivative H
is nonzero for some continuity point t = t j ofû(:) for j 6 = i; then a strict Pareto improvement is possible.
Then a su¢ cient condition for Pareto inoptimality is as follows.
Theorem 2. Assume m > 2, (9), no end conditions. If, for each j; for some continuity point t = t j ofû(:); for some u j 2 R kj ;
is nonzero and has the same sign for all i 6 = j; then a strict Pareto improvement is possible.
Here, instead of the condition related to (10), we can assume that for some point t j 2 (0; T ); some u j 2 R kj either
is nonzero and has the same sign for all i 6 = j (t and t+ means left and right limits). This condition implies the condition related to (10). (A similar comment of course pertains also to Theorem 1.) Theorem 3 Assume m 2 and no end conditions. Assume that there exist pairs (t j ; u j ); t j 2 (0; T ), u j 2 U j ; j = 1; :::; m, such that, for any i; either
with strict inequality holding for i 6 = j; or
with strict inequality holding for i 6 = j:
Then a strict Pareto improvement is possible 3 .
A weaker condition is su¢ cient for obtaining this conclusion, see the next theorem.
Theorem 4 Assume m 2, no end conditions. Assume that for all j; there exist triples (s j ; t j ; u j ); s j > 0; t j 2 (0; T ); u j 2 U j such that for each i;
( meaning either t j or t j +; which one can depend on j). Then a strict Pareto improvement is possible.
B. Assume no end conditions, that T = 1; and that for some positive constantsk; B and b; for all x, j@f (i) (t; x;û(t))=@x
It is assumed thatk P i n i < b holds. In this case, the adjoint functions satis…es a new set of conditions, namely
(The maximum conditions for each players are still satis…ed by p (i) (t);
For these p
functions, Theorems 1 -4 hold (in case of Theorem 1 and 2 (9) is assumed).
C. When the horizon is …nite, Theorems 1 and 2 also hold for end constrained problems, provided, for each i; f i and g i do not depend on u (j) ; j 6 = i; and provided, (a) the rank of i g
ui (T;x(T );û i (T )) equals k i ; the number of end constrained states of
The condition (a) can be replaced by the weaker condition (b): For some
juj Kg B; B := f(0; :::; 0; y k i +1 ; :::;
Let k i ; i = 1; 2 be states (real capital belonging to player i). The capital k i develops according to
where C i is the consumption of player i (the control of player i). The constraint on his capital is
Now, i is de…ned and continuous for k 1 ; k 2 0; continuously di¤erentiable for k 1 ; k 2 > 0; with @ i =@k i > 0 for k 1 ; k 2 > 0; and either ( ) @ i =@k j > 0 for k 1 ; k 2 > 0; j 6 = i; or ( ) @ i =@k j < 0 for k 1 ; k 2 > 0; j 6 = i; and with i 0;
where v i (C); de…ned on [0; 1); is continuous, increasing and concave, and is
Assume that an open loop Nash equilibrium (Ĉ i (t);k i (t)); i = 1; 2, exists, withk i (t) > 0 for all t: We have
Let us …rst discuss the solutions of the equations (13) in an informal way. Consider …rst the case
kj > 0; (j 6 = i; here and below) With p
(j) (t) > 0 for t close to T; and from the equations it is apparent that this will continue backwards to t = 0: Consider next the case
kj is positive), so for t close to T; p
This will apparently be the case all the way back to 0; because the two terms in the expression for _ p
(j) ) are both < 0 (respectively > 0). A formal proof is obtained by a "backwards version" (presented as Lemma 4 in Appendix) of Theorem A.7 (see also Note A.4) in Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987) . Consider the case (j) (j 6 = i); by the same type of arguments we get, for all t; p
By the maximum condition, p
(i) (T ) = 0; a contradiction. So for some t;Ĉ(t) > 0, and at t H (j) (t) 6 = 0; j 6 = i 2 f1; 2g; t < T , so a strict Pareto improvement is possible, according to C and Theorem 1. (Trivially, the rank condition holds, @ i =@C i = 1:)
If there are several players and, for each j; @ i =@k j > 0 for all i 6 = j; or @ i =@k j < 0 for all j 6 = i, then by the same arguments a strict Pareto improvement is possible.
Closed loop controls Assume that all controls appearing in the problems are closed loop control, i.e. functions of t and x: In particular, assume that u (j) (t; x); j = 1; :::; m; form a closed loop Nash equilibrium, with corresponding solutionsx (j) (t). Suppose that u (j) (t; x); j = 1; :::; m; are C 1 for all j: Then
; where u(t; x) = ( u (1) (t; x); :::; u (m) (t; x)); (x(t) = (x (1) (t); :::;x (m) (t))): With this change, for u(t) = u(t;x(t)); the theorems above still hold.
(So, for j = 1; :::; m, adding small constants to u (j) (t; x) on small time intervals improves payo¤s to all players, when the conditions in the theorems are satis…ed.)
If there are surfaces in (t; x) -space on which u (j) (t; x) is discontinuous, then allowing jumps in p (i) (:) may sometimes work, see Seierstad and Stabrun (2010) , further comments on this case are omitted.
Proofs The proof of Theorem 4 in the no end constraint case follows directly from standard result in control theory, see Lemma 1 in Appendix. To apply the lemma, in (11) we need to (and can) move the points t j slightly apart and such that they are continuity points ofû(:) and with the following inequality holding:
Theorems 1 and 2 follow from the same argument, because, for any j, there is a u j close toû (j) (t j ) such that, because t j is a continuity point, for i 6 = j the inequalities in Theorem 3 hold even for 0 replaced by j ju j û j (t j )j for some j > 0, while for i = j; the inequalities hold if 0 is replaced by " j (ju j û j (t)j); where " j (:) is negative and of the second order in ju
and hence, in a shorthand notation, for any i 6 = j;
Summing over j 6 = i; we get (14); for s j = 1:
Proof in case of C (end restrictions):
Proposition. In case of C a strict Pareto improvementũ i (t) ofû i (t); i = 1; :::; m; exists when it is required thatx i (T ) 2 A i for all i,x i (t); i = 1; :::; m, the solution corresponding toũ j (t); j = 1; :::; m:
We give only a proof for k i = k i : An easy modi…cation, using auxiliary controls, gives a proof in the case k i < k i : Let C i (s; t) be the resolvent of the equation
x (t;x(t);û i (t))q (i) ; (C i (t; t) = I, the identity matrix,
(1) ; :::; g (m) ); u (j) = (û 1 (t j ); :::;û j 1 (t j ); u j ;û j+1 (t j ); :::;û m (t j )):
I. Assume …rst that for some a > 0 for each i there exist a u i 2 U i such that in this equality, we get that
As explained below (dropping writingx in f (i) ; g (i) and H (j) ); we have [dW
Here we have used, successively, (1): Lemma 1 in Appendix, (2):
(i) (T )(I i ) = 0 and
(the u i 's where so chosen above); for any x p
and (5): inequality (14):
Let U 00 be the set of measurable functions u(:) = (u 1 (:); :::; u m (:)); u j (t) 2 U j ; and let q u; u , u; u 2 U 00 ; be de…ned by _ q u; u (t) = g x (t; x u (t); u(t))q u; u (t) + g(t; x u (t); u(t)) g(t; x u (t); u(t)); q u; u (0) = 0;
and let q = ( q 1 ; :::; q m ); x = ( 1 x 1 ; :::; m x m ): In fact, j q u ;û (T ) qj is of the second order in (apply Lemma 1 in Appendix to q u ;û rather than to x u ), and q = 0 by (15): Now, (9) and the rank condition in C is easily seen to imply that for some " 0 > 0; B(0; 3" 0 ) clcof q u;û (T ) : u 2 U 00 ; essupjuj Kg say for K = 1+essupjû(t)j. Because q u; u (T ) is close to q u;û (T ) uniformly in u 2 U K := fu 2 U 00 : essupjuj Kg when is small, then for some 00 > 0; 
see Lemma 3 in Appendix: Because j q u ;û (T ) qj and jx u (T ) q u ;û (T )j are of the second order, then, for small, j x u (T ) qj "( ); for some second order term "( ): Fix a 0 2 (0; ] such that 2 "( )="
II. We cannot always …nd u j with the properties above. By (9) and the rank condition in C and the inverse function theorem; there exists a constantK such that we can …nd a pair (a; u); a > 0, u = ( u 1 ; ::::; u m ); u arbitrarily close toû(T ), such that for all j;
III. By Lemma 2 at = 0; dWũ i =d = dW u i =d i =2; and the proof is …nished.
Appendix. In Appendix, we consider a standard control problem
(x u the solution corresponding to u = u(:)), U a …xed bounded set, f; g; f x ; g x continuous.
Let U 0 be the set of measurable functions with values in U; letû(:) 2 U 0 be a given control with corresponding solution (of 18) denotedx(t) (assumed to exist), and let q u;û (:), u = u(:) 2 U 0 ; be the solution of _ q u;û (t) = g x (t;x(t);û(t))q u;û + g(t;x(t);û(t)) g(t;x(t);û(t)); q u;û (0) = 0:
Let C(t; s) be the resolvent of the equation _ q(t) = g x (t;x(t);û(t))q; and let p 0 (:) be the solution of
Let (u; u 0 ) := measft : u(t) 6 = u 0 (t)g: Let ft j g be a …nite set of distinct continuity points ofû(:), let u j 2 U; and let u (t) :
H(t; x; u; p) = f (t; x; u) + pg(t; x; u):
(The derivatives do exist, as 0 they are actually right derivatives.)
Proof For a single point t j the second equality is proved in Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987) , see p. 221. The …rst equality is proved in many proofs of the maximum principle, see e.g. Lemma 14.1, p. 50 in Fleming and Rishel (1975) . Treating W as a state in an augmented system (with states (W; x 1 ; :::; x n )), yields that dW u (T )=d equals P j (1; 0; ::
whereC(t; s) is the resolvent of the augmented system. The last sum equals the sum in the second equality in the Lemma.
Lemma 2 Assume that u 2 U 0 ; > 0; are given controls such that (u ; u ) "( ); "( ) a second order term. Then dx u (T )=d = dx u (T )=d and dW u =d = dW u =d : (The derivatives do exist.)
Proof It follows from (8) p. 485 in Seierstad (1970) 
is of the second order in . Treating W as a state in an augmented system, yields also for the state W that W u (T ) W u (T ) is of the second order in :
Let := x ! (x 1 ; :::; x n ); n n and as before, letû 2 U 0 be a given control for which a solution xû(:) exists. Then, by general theory, for any u 2 U 
Proof Lemma 3 follows from modi…cations of almost any proof of the maximum principle. If Theorems 1 and 2 in Seierstad (1970) are used (with A = U 0 ; @ = ; T = 1); note that, if A d = B( a; M d=2) (as here assumed); then (D) in Theorem 1 holds for all a; a
This follows from the continuous di¤erentiability established on top of p. 485 in Seierstad (1970) . (Note that for u; u 0 2 U 0 ; jg(t; x(:); u(:)) g(t; x(:); u 0 (:))j 1 ; jg x (:; x(:); u(:)) jg x (:; x(:); u 0 (:))j 1 M (u(:); u 0 (:)); for all continuous x(:) with values in B; compare jj:jj in (7) in Seierstad (1970) .) From this continuous di¤erentiability, it also follows that, uniformly in u; q u;û 0 (T ) is close to q u;û (T ) whenû 0 is close toû: So, using Lemma 11.1 in Seierstad (1975) 
, see proof of Theorem 1 in Seierstad (1970) . Then for = minf 0 ; M d 0 =4g; for a replaced by a 0 =û 0 2 U and A d replaced by A d ; the conclusion in Theorem 1 (in Seierstad (1970) 
Lemma 4. Consider the vector di¤erential equation _ x = h(t; x), x(0) = x 0 ; x 0 given (h continuous, locally Lipschitz in x) on [0; T ] and suppose there exists a vector x such that, for all i; h i (t; x) 0 for all x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) that satisfy x j x j ; j 6 = i; x i = x i : Then any solution x(:); with x j (T ) x j for all j; satis…es x j (t) x j for all j; t 2 [0; T ]:
Proof When x(:) exists, by general theory also _ x = h(t; x ) ; x (T ) = x(T ); > 0; small, has a solution x (t) that converges to x(:) as # 0: Now, for t < T; it is easily seen that x i (t) > x i for all i: First, note that for a small interval (r; T ); x i (t) > x i for all i all t 2 (r; T ): For each i either x i (T ) > x i ; or x i (T ) = x i and in the latter case _ x i (T ) = h i (T; x (T )) < 0; and, in both cases, for some r close to T; x i (t) > x i in (r; T ): Evidently, r can be chosen independent of i: Let (s; T ) be the largest interval for which x i (t) > x i for all i; all t 2 (s; T ); and assume by contradiction that s > 0: Evidently x i (s) x i for all i: For each i; either (a) x i (s) > x i or (b) x i (s) = x i and in the latter case _ x i (s) = h i (s; x (s)) < 0: In both cases (a) and (b) x i (t) > x i for t in a small interval (r 0 ; r 00 ) around s; in case (b) because _ x i (t) = h i (t; x (t)) < 0 not only for t = s; but for t in a small interval (r 0 ; r 00 ) around s: With x i (r 00 ) x i (in fact, x i (r 00 ) > x i ), this gives x i (t) > x i for all t 2 (r 0 ; r 00 ): The interval (r 0 ; r 00 ) can be taken to be independent of i: Hence, x i (t) > x i for t 2 (r 0 ; T ) for all i; a contradiction. So x i (t) > x i for t 2 (0; T ) for all i: As x (t) ! x(t); x i (t) x i for all t 2 (0; T ); and then in [0; T ].
Let jy(:)j 1 be the supnorm sup t jy(t)j.
Lemma 5 Let g in (18) also depend on a vector y R k ; so g = g(t; x; y; u). Let g; g x and g y be continuous in Seierstad (1970) 5 . From this continuous di¤erentiability, it also follows that, uniformly in u; q u;û;ŷ 0 (T ) is close to q u;û;ŷ (T ) whenŷ 0 is j:j 1 close toŷ: So, using Lemma 11.1 in Seierstad (1975) , if B( p; 3 e) clco q
; see Proof of Theorem 1 in Seierstad (1970) . Then the conclusion in Theorem 1 (in Seierstad (1970)) 5 To see this, one might imagine that the state x is agumented by including even y, with _ y = v; y(0) = y 0 ; v 2 clB(0; K) as an additional trivial state equation, v an auxiliary control. Note that for u; u 0 2 U 0 ; jg(t; x(:); y(:)u(:)) g(t; x(:); y(:); u 0 (:))j 1 ; jgx(:; x(:); y(:); u(:)) jgx(:; x(:); y(:); u 0 (:))j 1 M (u(:); u 0 (:)); for all continuous (x(:) ; y(:)) with values in B; compare jj:jj in (7) in Seierstad (1970 
0 be a positive number and let Y be a set of absolutely continuous functions from [0; T ] into R k such that j _ y(t)j b 0 a.e. and y(0) = y 0 ; y 0 …xed:
Lemma 6. Assume in the situation of Lemma 5 that Y Y 00 and that Y is closed in sup-norm. For any given y = y(:) 2 Y; letX(y) be the set of solutions x u (:) of (18) obtained when u(:) varies through U 0 ; and for a given vector z; let X(y) := fx(:) 2X(y) : x(T ) = zg; assumed to be nonempty for each y 2 Y: For all y 2 Y; for some b y > 0; all x(:) 2 X(y) is assumed to satisfy jx(:)j b y : For a …xed vector a; with a k = 0; k n ; let X (y) be the set of x(:) maximizing ax(T ) in X(y); i.e. maziming ax(T ) subject to x(T ) = z: For any y; if x u (:); u(:) is any pair such that x u (:) 2 X (y); assume that the necessary conditions (maximum principle) are satis…ed for p 0 = 1; not p 0 = 0, p 0 2 f0; 1g the multiplier in the transversality condition p k (T ) = p 0 a k ; k > n (no information on p k (T ); k n ): Assume that U is compact and, for all (t; x; y); y 2 Y; that g(t; x; y; U ) is convex.
Then X (y) is nonempty and has a closed graph as a function of y.
Proof. Recall the measurable selection lemma that _ x(t) 2 g(t; x(t); y(t); U ) () _ x = g(t; x(t); y(t); u(t)) for some measurable u(:) : J ! U: See Section 8.3 in Cesari (1983) . Moreover, for any y; standard existence theorems (Cesari (1983) Theorem 9.2.i, p. 311) gives that X (y) is nonempty. To prove the closed graph property, assume that x n = x n (:) 2 X (y n ); x n ! x = x(:) in sup-norm, y n ! y in sup-norm, y = y(:) and y n = y n (:) belonging to Y; and let us show that x 2 X (y):
Consider the "orientor equations" _ x(t) 2 g(t; x(t); y(t); U ); _ y(t) 2 clB(0; b 0 ); x(0) = x 0 ; y(0) = y 0 : The result 8.6. in Cesari (1983) p. 299 immediately yields that x(:) 2 X(y) as g(t; x; y; U ) has Cesari's property (Q): Let us prove that x(:) 2 X (y): Take any x in X (y); with corresponding control u : The fact that the necessary conditions are not satis…ed for p 0 = 0 means that for some 6 " > 0; B(0; 3") clco q U;u ;y (T ): Then B(0; 2") clco q U;u ;yn (T ) for all y n close to y; see Lemma 5. By Lemma 5, for some d
Now, for any natural number m such that 1=m d 0 ; a number n m m exists, such that jy nm yj 1=m () y nm 2 Y d 0 ) and such that nm 1=m, where n = 2j x u ;yn (T ) + x (T )j: Then, x u yn m (T ) + x (T ) 2 B(0; nm ) B(0; "=m) B(0; d 0 "): Thus, by (19), for some u nm 2 U 0 ; (u nm ; u ) T =m; x un m ;ynm (T ) g (i) are nondecreasing in 8 x (i) for each (x i ; u; t); that f (i) and g i are concave in (x i ; u (i) ) for each (x 1 ; t) and that U is convex and compact. Finally, Lemma 8 (as well as Lemma 7) holds even we add the requirements i k (t; x (i)( (t)) 0 ( i k given continuous functions), k = 1; :::; k i on x (i) (:) for x (i) (:) to be admissible, provided the set of admissible solutions, still denoted X i (y); is nonempty for all y 2 Y:
Using an existence result of the type of Theorem 9, p. 135 in Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987) , the proof is essentially the same ((21) holds automatically).
Existence of a Nash equilibrium in the example. We now assume that _ k 1 : _ k 2 are the controls, denote u 1 and u 2 . We assume that the Given any y = (y 1 ; y 2 ); let k i (:) be any y -admissible solution (meaning, say for i = 1; that _ k 1 = 1 (k 1 ; y 2 ) C i for some C i (:)). Let [0; s] be the largest interval on which k i (t) < K for t < s; i = 1; 2: Then we have _ k i (t) c + d(k 1 (t) + k 2 (t) ) + d 0 (k 1 (t) k 2 (t) ) < c + 2dK + d 0 K + for t < s; so k i (s) < k 1 (0) + k 2 (0) + cT + 2dK T + d From now on consider i = 1; the case i = 2 has a completely symmetric treatment. Let _ k 1 = maxf 1 (k 1 ; 0); 1 (k 1 ; K)g, k 1 (T ) = k T 1 =2: Let (s; T ] be the largest interval on which k 1 (t) > 0: Then k 1 (s) 0; but k 1 (s) = 0; gives k 1 (:) 0 on [s; T ] (just insert in the equation and check!); so by uniqueness of solutions 9 even k 1 (s) > 0 and [s; T ] is largest only if s = 0; (and k 1 (:) > 0 in [0; T ]): De…ne = min 1 k 1 (t) > 0: Then, for any y, for any y -admissible k 1 (:) we have automatically k 1 (:) =2 > 0 : If for some t 0 ; k 1 (t 0 ) =2 < k 1 (t 0 ); then on a maximal interval (t 0 ; s); k 1 (t) < k 1 (t); but _ k 1 _ k 1 as long as k 1 k 1 so even k 1 (s) < k 1 (s); so s = T and k 1 (T ) k 1 (T ) = k T 1 =2; which is impossible. So k 1 (t) =2 for all t: Hence" for any y; if k i (:) is y admissible, then (k 1 (:); k 2 (:)) 2 Y . Moreover, Y is compact in sup-norm. Let K 1 (y) be the set of optimal solutions in Problem 1, given y(:) (i.e. y 2 (:)); and let K 2 (y) be correspondingly de…ned.
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